The Alphaville Herald

Of Interest & Rebuttal

by Alphaville Herald on 04/12/03 at 11:27 pm

Fristly, Lawmeme’s James Grimmalman has posted an Excellent discussion of the State of Play Confereance and what it’s ramifications are and may be. It is officially required reading for the lot of you. Here is a direct link to said article.

For those of you interested below you will find a rebuttal to recent comments on Games, World-Games Games-in-Worlds, Worlds and Realities, Part 1

The contentions being levied against my attempts to define “game” as a discreet term,

>I guess I don’t see the point, much less the urgency of this exercise. Wittgenstein told us a
>long time ago that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for games. There are just
>some family resemblences between kinds of games. Even if there were interesting criteria of
>individuation would it matter? I say: taxonomy is about as illuminating as taxidermy.
>Peter Ludlow

my reply

Firstly, I don’t find Wittgenstein’s summarization of games to be applicable any longer. Although it is a solid concept, I feel that games have grown in scope and depth to such an extent that we require a solid taxonimy inorder to differentiate the subtlties within them.

2ndly, While again, I would agree with Wittgenstein, re: family resemblences between knids of games, what I’m aiming for is to segregate all kinds og games, being structures and sytems that posses the attribute of “game-ness” from all types on non-games. This is not to suggest that non-games cannot share some attribute of games, nor is it to suppose that some games will share other defining attributes with non-gmes. Rather it is to demarcate a territory in our world of systems establishing “games and game-ness” as sufficiently different from other systems in-order to impart, in the minimal, a heightened meaning to all systems involved in light of their differential/alternative/oppositional definitions. It is only with this meaning and the differential value imparted by such meaning embedding guidlines by which we can have clear concise communication of the system whole.

Ludlow’s rebuttal;
squirrel, you’re not making sense. You say…

but that’s like saying we need a taxonomy to have a taxonomy. Well, I suppose, but the question was “what the hell is the point of the taxonomy.” And while I am no fan of Wittgenstein, his point is surely not undermined by the fact that we have may more kinds of games than we used to. Having more games and kinds of games surely only strenghtens his point: that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for gamehood.

re-rebuttal,

We need a taxonimy, Because communication is aided when it can rely upon a set of well defined points to which anyone can turn to for understanding. Because speaking of these thing that we play as all being games is a bit like refferring to invertebrates and vertabrates as being animals, while certainly it is true, a bit more discretion is neccessary inoreder to facilitate meaningful communication. Because the distinctions that I am highlighting exist, whether or not I discuss them, and owing that they are an important part of these things we do, we require a robust language with which to navigate and make sense of them. Because good terminology and strong forms are the foundation upon which greater theory can be built. I feel that there is a situation which calls out for a defining of terms, that there exists a mis communication in the discourse (for example, we refer to these things as V, TerraNova uses VW, while Greg Costikyn simply calls them all games. We’re all talking about the same thing, perhaps, but the discuourse is threatening to become muddled).

Baudrillard: “It is on the basis of meaning that one will be master of language, master of communication. . .”

Meaning can be derived either from consensus (i.e. assigning a commodity value to it, the agreement upon which we become able to weigh value and meaning) or by transcending the commodity/consensual structure and deriving meaning from the dual/collusive relation between the subject and it’s other. A differential or oppositional definition is stronger because it’s value cannot be undermined by disagreement..

Re: Wittgenstein’s Familial Relations as they pertain to games.

I would rather throw all his talk away, and I am a fan of Wittgenstein. But, his system of relations hampers our ability to make meaningful distinctions. Not to be a screw but, if everything is merely a collection of attributes, bearing relation to other collections of attributes, and gaining familial value based on these similarities, where in can we determine where one collection ends and the next begins? How, if this is the paradigm, can we navigate a world where there is no determinate value only an ambiguous sea of attributes and similarities upon which we agree to draw boundries? That doesn’t seem to reliable. Even so, let’s say we do use this model, and certainly it is a great way for me to say that Dungeons & Dragons bears (relation A) with Checkers & (Relation B) with live theatre, but, we cannot discuss the differences between them as our discourse is limited to noting similarities. The very language precludes the discussion of dissimilarities. The diferences between subjects are danced around and ignoredIt seem weak to say that “Checkers” represents a collection of attributes A-G and Dungeons & Dragons represents Attributes D-L and Theatre Represents attributes J-P. At what point can I say that Theatre differs from checkers by Mode Z? I cannot because the utterance of that creates a similarity between the two collections, this similarity is the shared relation of disimilarity Mode Z. rendering my utterence moot. And, where does this Mode lie? is it part of a collection of attributes? Does it bear relation to both checkers and theatre? Doesn’t this lead us into an infinite regression of searching for fractal modes of similarity?

This regression destroys the hope of finding differential or oppositional value. Terms become too connected to be spoken seperately of each other. We lose a great deal of play with the terms as well as losing the imperviousness of alternative or attributive meaning and value.

It is the differences as well as the similarities between terms and systems that give us space for exploration and fodder for insight. We need a distance between things inorder to understand them and transform them from ephemera into actionable terms.